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MAKING SENSE OF CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE: 
COMPETING MODELS AND TENSIONS 
Chris Cornforth 
(A pre-publication version of an article published in the Review of International Co-
operation, 2002) 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper focuses on how co-operatives and mutual associations are governed. At the 
heart of these arrangements is an organisation’s governing body or board. Paralleling 
developments in the private sector, the quality of governance of co-operatives has 
been questioned. Serious concerns have been raised both about the democratic 
legitimacy of boards and their effectiveness, for example the ability of lay board 
members to effectively supervise senior managers, ensure probity and protect the 
interests of members and other relevant stakeholdersi. 
 
These concerns have lead to renewed professional and academic interest in 
organisational governance and a growing body of literature and advice. Much of this 
literature is prescriptive in nature and aimed at addressing the perceived shortcomings 
of governing bodies. However, it has been criticised for oversimplifying the problems, 
underestimating the conflicting demands and pressures that board members face, and 
presenting solutions that are difficult to implement in practice. These shortcomings 
point to the need for a greater understanding of the way boards work that is grounded 
in studies of board behaviour. This paper attempts to address this problem by 
presenting a new framework for understanding the governance of co-operatives in 
terms of multiple theoretical perspectives and a number of key paradoxes or tensions 
that boards face. The paper addresses two related problems.  
 
First, the governance of co-operatives and mutuals is relatively under theorised. In 
contrast a variety of competing theories have been proposed to try to understand the 
role of boards in the private sector. The paper briefly reviews each of these theories 
and discusses how they can be usefully extended to throw light on the boards of co-
operatives.  
 
However, this raises a second related problem. Taken individually the different 
theories are rather one dimensional, only illuminating a particular aspect of the 
board’s role. This has lead to calls for a new framework that can help integrate the 
insights of these different perspectivesii. The paper argues that rather than choose 
between these different theories we need to find a way of drawing on the different 
insights they offer. It argues that, taken together, these theories are helpful in 
highlighting some of the important tensions and paradoxes that boards face, and 
which they must find ways of managing if they are to be successful. Based on this 
framework the paper outlines some of these key tensions: 
 
• The tension between board members acting as representatives for particular 
stakeholder groups and ‘experts’ charged with driving the performance of the 
organization forward. 
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• The tension between the board roles of driving organizational performance and 
ensuring conformance i.e. that the organisation behaves in an accountable and 
prudent manner. 
• The tension between boards having to both control and support management. 
• The tensions and conflicts that stem from accountabilities to multiple 
stakeholders. 
 
 
Competing perspectives on boards 
 
A variety of competing theories have been proposed to try to understand the role of 
boards in the private sector. Each implies a different model of how boards work and 
who should serve on them. Below each of these theoretical perspectives and 
associated models is briefly examined and how they can be usefully extended to 
throw light on the role of co-operative boards. However, we begin by looking at the 
democratic perspective on boards, which provides the dominant model on the role and 
practices of boards in co-operatives and mutual associations. 
A democratic or association perspective – a democratic model 
 
Democratic ideas and practices have been central to thinking about the governance of 
co-operatives and mutual associations. Democratic government is a central institution 
in Western societies. Key ideas and practices include: open elections on the basis of 
one person one vote; pluralism i.e. that representatives will represent different 
interests; accountability to the electorate; the separation of elected members, who 
make policy, from the executive, who implement policy decisions. Many of these 
ideas are embodied in principles underlying the governance of co-operatives. 
 
A democratic perspective on governance suggests that the job of the board is to 
represent the interests of the co-operative’s members. The role of board is to resolve 
or choose between the interests of different groups and set the overall policy of the 
organisation, which can then be implemented by staff. Central to this view is the idea 
of a lay or non-professional board, where any member can put himself or herself 
forward for election as a board member.  Expertise is not a central requirement, as it is 
in the partnership model of the board we shall discuss below. 
 
Agency theory – a compliance model 
 
Agency theory has been the dominant theory of the corporation and corporate 
governance arrangements in the private sectoriii. It assumes that the owners of an 
enterprise and those that manage it (their agents) will have different interests. Hence 
the owners or shareholders of any enterprise face a problem that managers are likely 
to act in their own interests rather than to their benefit. While free markets are seen as 
the best restraint on managerial discretion, agency theory sees corporate governance 
arrangements as another means to ensure that management acts in the best interests of 
shareholders. This suggests that a majority of board members should be independent 
of management, and that their primary role is one of ensuring managerial compliance 
– i.e. to monitor and if necessary control the behaviour of management to ensure it 
acts in the shareholders best interests. This model can be quite easily extended to co-
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operatives and suggests similarly that the main role of the board is to ensure managers 
act in the interests of the co-operative’s members. 
 
Stewardship theory – a partnership model 
 
Stewardship theory is grounded in a human relations perspective and starts from 
opposite assumptions to agency theoryiv. It assumes that managers want to do a good 
job and will act as effective stewards of an organisation’s resources. As a result senior 
management and the ‘owners’ of the organisation are better seen as partners. Hence, 
the main function of the board is not to ensure managerial compliance or 
conformance, but to work with management to improve organisational performance. 
The role of the board is primarily strategic, to add value to top decisions. In this 
context it is not surprising that management ideas and practices should be applied to 
governance. From this perspective board members should be selected on the basis of 
their expertise and contacts so that they are in a position to add value to the 
organisation's decisions; boards and managers should receive proper induction and 
training; they should know how to operate effectively as a team etc.  Ideas such as 
these are common in much of the ‘how-to-do-it’ literature on boards. For co-
operatives this raises the question how can boards have the necessary expertise when 
their members are elected? 
 
Resource dependency theory – a co-optation model 
 
Resource dependency theory views organisations as interdependent with their 
environmentv. Organisations depend crucially for their survival on other organisations 
and actors for resources. As a result they need to find ways of managing this 
dependence and ensuring they get the resources and information they need. From this 
perspective the board is seen as one means of reducing uncertainty by creating 
influential links between organisations through for example interlocking directorates. 
The main functions of the board are to maintain good relations with key external 
stakeholders in order to ensure the flow of resources into and from the organisation, 
and to help the organisation respond to external change. Board members are selected 
for the important external links and knowledge they can bring to the organisation, and 
to try to co-opt potential external threats. Again this raises an issue for co-operatives 
when board members are elected. 
Stakeholder theory – a stakeholder model 
 
Stakeholder theory is based on the premise that organisations should be responsible to 
a range of groups (or stakeholders) in society other than just an organisation’s owners, 
or in the case of a co-operative its membersvi. By incorporating different stakeholders 
on boards it is expected that organisations will be more likely to respond to broader 
social interests than the narrow interests of one group. This leads to a political role for 
boards negotiating and resolving the potentially conflicting interests of different 
stakeholder groups in order to determine the objectives of the organisation and set 
policy. For co-operatives this raises the question how should the interests of other 
important stakeholders besides members be represented. 
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Managerial hegemony theory – a ‘rubber stamp’ model 
 
Managerial hegemony theory relates to the thesis that although shareholders may 
legally own and control large corporations they no longer effectively control them. 
Control having been effectively ceded to a new professional managerial class. From 
this perspective the board ends up as little more than a ‘rubber stamp’ for 
management’s decisions. Its function is essentially symbolic - to legitimise 
management’s actions. Although this theory was developed in the study of large 
business corporations, many of the processes it describes seem just as relevant to co-
operatives: for example the separation of a co-operative’s members from those that 
manage it, and the increasing growth and professionalisation of management. This 
raises the question for all organisations including co-operatives what can be done to 
ensure boards are able to exercise real power and influence when required. 
 
The paradoxes and tensions boards face 
 
Taken individually these different theories are rather one dimensional, and can be 
criticised for only illuminating a particular aspect of the board’s work. This has lead 
to calls for a new conceptual framework that can help integrate the insights of these 
different perspectives. A paradox perspective offers a promising approach to 
providing this new conceptual framework. Taken together these multiple theoretical 
perspectives are helpful in highlighting some of the important paradoxes and tensions 
that boards face. 
 
Who governs -the tension between ‘lay’ and professional boards  
 
The different models have different implications for who should serve on boards. The 
opposition is clearest between the partnership and democratic models. The partnership 
model stresses that board members should have expertise and experience that can add 
value to the performance of the organisation. The implication is that board members 
should be selected for their professional expertise and skills. In contrast the 
democratic model on which co-operatives are based stresses that board members are 
lay representatives there to serve members they represent. Other models suggest board 
members should be selected because of their contacts and experience or because they 
represent stakeholder interests. 
 
Co-operatives need to consider how they can best manage these tensions. How can the 
expertise, experience or contacts of boards be increased without undermining 
democratic principles? A variety of options are available. For example, can more be 
done to encourage members with relevant expertise and experience to stand for 
election? Are there procedures to induct and develop new board members? Is training 
available for board members? Can co-options be used to bring missing skills, 
experience or contacts onto the board? Can other consultative forums be developed to 
make sure that other stakeholders’ views are considered? 
 
Board roles - the tension between the conformance and performance  
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The different theories of governance put different emphasise on what are the main 
roles of the board. This is most apparent in the opposition between the agency and 
stewardship perspectives. What Garratt has called the ‘conformance’ versus 
‘performance’ role of boardsvii. The compliance model emphasises the conformance 
role of the board to ensure that the organisation acts in the interests of its ‘owners’ and 
to be a careful steward of their resources. In contrast the partnership model 
emphasises the role of the board in driving forward organisational performance 
through adding value to the organisation’s strategy and top decisions. 
 
Combining these roles can created difficult tensions for boards, as they demand very 
different kinds of attitudes and behaviour from board members. The conformance role 
demands careful monitoring and scrutiny of the organisation’s past performance and 
is risk averse.  The performance role demands forward vision, an understanding of the 
organisation and its environment and perhaps a greater willingness to take risks. 
Strategies for dealing with this tension include separating out different aspects of the 
board role over time through an annual cycle of meeting, the careful management of 
board agendas and skilful chairing of meetings. In particular it is often wise for boards 
to set aside periodic meetings free from routine items of business to focus on longer 
term strategic issues with management. 
Relationships with management - the tension between controlling and partnering  
 
The agency and democratic perspectives stress the importance of the board 
monitoring and controlling the work of managers (the executive).  In contrast 
stewardship theory stresses the role of the board as a partner to management, 
improving top management decision-making. The need to both control senior 
management and be their support and partner in decision making can be a source of 
role conflict and tension for board members. One way board members sometimes find 
it useful to think about their role is as a ‘critical friend’ to management. 
 
Another related tension facing boards and management concerns the lack of a clear 
boundary between their respective roles. The complex and interdependent nature of 
management and board roles offers plenty of scope for different interpretations of the 
relationship and conflict. Boards are frequently accused of meddling in the 
organisation’s work or not being involved enough. An important means of helping to 
establish a productive working relationship with management is through regular 
discussion and negotiation over respective roles and responsibilities. 
Multiple or ambiguous accountability 
 
There may be tension concerning to whom board members are accountable. Formally 
co-operatives are accountable to their members. However, a stakeholder perspective 
suggests that there are likely to be other stakeholders who have a legitimate interest in 
what the organisation does, and should in some way be able to hold it to account. 
Board members may experience tension because they feel accountable to more than 
one group, or because they are unclear or differ over who feel they are accountable to. 
An important exercise for any board and management team is to periodically review 
who it feels its main stakeholders are, and how their views are taken into account. 
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Conclusions 
 
The paper has shown how existing theories of corporate governance can be extended 
to help understand the governance of co-operatives, but that by themselves each is too 
one-dimensional only highlighting particular aspects of the board’s role. The paper 
argues that it is better to draw on the insights that each model offers rather than 
choose between them. As empirical research suggests governance is an inherently 
difficult and problematic activity. Taken together the different models highlight the 
important tensions and paradoxes boards face, which successful boards will need to 
learn how to manage. 
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